In this paper, we have achieved privacy protection and high transparency in a permissioned blockchain. There is a sidechain that connects the permissionless blockchain and the permissioned blockchain. The behavior in the permissioned blockchain is almost a black box from the perspective of the permissionless blockchain. While this fact is useful for privacy protection, there is room for improvement in terms of transparency. To improve the transparency of the permissioned blockchain under privacy protection, we consider traceability in the permissioned blockchain consisting of the following three properties: trade privacy (who trades with whom and at what asset amount), preservation (the total amount inside the permissioned blockchain, including deposits and withdrawals to the permissionless blockchain, is immutable), and noninvolvement (some members in the permissioned blockchain are not involved in some trades, and it is possible to prove that specified members performed the transaction). To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to achieve both preservation and noninvolvement while protecting the privacy of transactions. Our approach is as follows. We model traceability based on the hidden Markov model. Because the proof of traceability requires the calculation of more than quadratic degrees, we encrypt this model by homomorphic encryption. The number of participants in the permissioned blockchain corresponds to the number of additions in the model. Then, we can construct the encrypted model by employing somewhat homomorphic encryption. The establishment of the original model is verifiable by applying the noninteractive zero-knowledge proof of the knowledge that the plaintext is equal to zero. This is an adaptation of Benhamouda et al. (Asiacrypt 2014).
I. INTRODUCTION
Bitcoin [2] has spread over the past decade, and many cryptocurrencies continue to be born. Let us consider the cryptocurrencies' situation from the viewpoint of trade privacy. In Bitcoin, participants trade by using alias addresses called Bitcoin addresses. Since Bitcoin records the transaction history publicly, the realization of trade privacy is difficult with Bitcoin. Several cryptocurrencies protect trade privacy. However, such cryptocurrencies are feared to be misused for money laundering and are subject to regulation around the world.
The underlying technology of Bitcoin is now called blockchain. In a blockchain, members manage ledgers in a distributed manner. Wüst et al. classified blockchain into the following two types with the member's participation [3] .
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One is a permissioned blockchain in which only authorized members can participate. Hyperledger Fabric [4] is an implementation of permissioned blockchains. The other is a permissionless blockchain that does not require permission to participate. Bitcoin, Ethereum [5] , and many cryptocurrencies are implementations of permissionless blockchains. Let us describe a sidechain connecting these blockchains. Processing transactions in bitcoin itself, we face low throughput and the scalability problem. In order to avoid the problems, there are off-chain technologies that we can process transactions outside the blockchain (e.g., Lightning network [6] ). One of these off-chain technologies is a sidechain. Connecting the permissioned blockchain to a permissionless blockchain with sidechain technology, we can transfer assets through the permissionless blockchain while enjoying high throughput processing in the permissioned blockchain.
Blockchain also attracts attention in commercial activities and is useful in various situations such as trade finance, fund VOLUME 8, 2020 This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License. For more information, see http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ procurement, contract management and execution, and supply chain management. In commercial activities, companies want to protect trade privacy by keeping it secret. Therefore, companies often use permissioned blockchain with authorized participants. On the other hand, corporations disclose various types of information in order to fulfill their social responsibilities. For example, transparency of accounting is necessary for proper tax payment and information provision to investors. Tracking objects in supply chain management is also essential. In other words, transparency is vital for corporate activities. Regarding the transparency of the transaction history, the concept of traceability is common in the field of supply chain management. In this way, using blockchain in corporate activities, it is crucial to balance trade privacy and transparency. It is essential to share the contents of the permissioned blockchain with not only participants but also outsiders. What is the traceability that balances between trade privacy and transparency? First, we pay attention to trade privacy. The transaction price and volume are information strictly related to corporate activities. A bank generally handles account balances and transaction histories as a secret since these are client privacy information. Similarly, it is natural to handle the transaction history inside the permissioned blockchain used in corporate activities as a secret to an external party. Then, under the protection of the trade privacy, we consider two properties that consist of transparency. (If all transactions are public, then the transparency holds obviously.)
• Preservation: An outsider can verify that there are no illegal transactions inside the permissioned blockchain.
• Noninvolvement: If there is a defect in the traded goods, the permissioned blockchain can disclose the participants who participated in the trade as needed. How can we balance trade privacy and transparency for third parties other than participants? In our solution, we model the trading dynamics in the permissioned blockchain first. Next, we realize the trade privacy by encrypting this model with fully homomorphic encryption and transparency by proving the equations of the encrypted model with zero-knowledge proof of plaintext knowledge. We utilize two ingredients: zero-knowledge proof and fully homomorphic encryption. Let us introduce these as follows.
A zero-knowledge proof is the following method: A person or a party (prover) has secret knowledge (witness). He wants to tell others (verifier) that the proposition on this witness is true without conveying any knowledge other than being true. Goldwasser et al. formulated this method [7] . The zero-knowledge proof needs to satisfy the following three conditions:
• Completeness denotes a prover can convince a verifier if the prover has a true witness.
• Soundness denotes when a cheating prover has no true witness, and the verifier is to recognize that it is false.
• Zero-knowledge denotes a cheating verifier, who attempts to steal the witness from a prover and cannot obtain any knowledge other than the ''proposition is true.'' Fully homomorphic encryption is capable of both addition and multiplication. It has not existed for a long time. However, Gentry announced fully homomorphic encryption in 2009 [8] . The learning with errors (LWE)/Ring-LWE scheme [9] , [10] has also gained attention in terms of homomorphic encryption, although there are various methods for the lattice-based cryptography. There are several schemes [11] - [13] . Several implementations are already available [14] - [16] . Furthermore, several zero-knowledge proofs that can indicate the plaintext knowledge to a verifier without decryption have been proposed [17] - [19] .
A. OUR RESULT
This work provides the basic technology to achieve meaningful traceability in the blockchain that balances the privacy and transparency of transactions in corporate activities. In this subsection, we describe the overview, threat model, and scenario regarding our result.
1) OVERVIEW
In our solution, we model the trading dynamics in the permissioned blockchain. Next, we realize the trade privacy by encrypting this model with fully homomorphic encryption and transparency by proving the equations of the encrypted model with the zero-knowledge proof of plaintext knowledge. The calculations for traceability require more than quadratic degrees. Since this is not 2-DNF, we cannot use the traditional method [20] . Therefore, we use fully homomorphic encryption. Furthermore, the lattice-based zero-knowledge proof has been actively studied recently [21] , [22] . We adapt the work of Benhamouda et al. in Asiacrypt 2014 [17] . By combining fully homomorphic encryption and the zero-knowledge proof, we prove the establishment of the encrypted model by the zero-knowledge proof of knowledge in which plaintext is zero. We introduce the three properties of traceability concretely as follows.
• Trade-Privacy
Trade privacy is privacy regarding who trades with whom and at what asset amount in the blockchain. We denote x(t), u(t) and y(t) as a vector of the participants' states in the permissioned blockchain, a vector of inputs and outputs in the permissioned blockchain, respectively. Let A(t), B(t) and C(t) be matrices of the ''distribution ratios''. x(t), A(t), B(t) and C(t) correspond to ''who trades with whom, and at what asset amount.'' These are private although u(t) and y(t) are public. We express the relation as a hidden Markov model:
Moreover, we mention the security of trade privacy. To protect privacy, the private information A(t), B(t), C(t) and x must be in hiding. We say that the trade privacy is secure, meaning that no probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm can distinguish whether the distribution ratios A(t), B(t), C(t) and the internal state x(t) were encrypted with honest plaintexts or just zeros (false plaintexts). As these items of information A(t), B(t), C(t) and x(t) must be private, this definition makes sense.
• Transparency Transparency consists of preservation and noninvolvement.
-Preservation: the total amount of assets in the blockchain, including input and output, is immutable. That is,
under the condition that
it is possible to prove that some blockchain participants are not involved in a series of transactions. For some participant i, a ij = c ij = 0 for all j = i, a ji = c ji = 0 for all j = i, b ji = 0 for all j.
We encrypt all the above equations with Ring-LWE encryption. The fact that f (x) = y holds in plaintext means that the ciphertext of f (x) − y is a ciphertext of zero. Letting a prover be the permissioned blockchain and a verifier be the permissionless blockchain, we prove with zeroknowledge that each encrypted function corresponds to a plaintext m = 0.
2) THREAT MODEL
We assume an adversary outside the blockchain as a threat. Our solution protects the privacy of the blockchain inside information from an actively external adversary. They can intervene in transactions between the permissioned blockchain and the permissionless blockchain. Their ability is computationally limited. Their goal is to break the trade privacy and create fake transactions and proofs. We also suppose the universal composable security [23] . On the other hand, we assume that participants in the permissioned blockchain are reliable as honest insiders, and the adversary cannot corrupt any insiders. This is the reason why the distributed ledger of the permissioned blockchain contains the content that participants want to keep secret from outside third parties. That is, participants trust each other and share the secret in the permissioned blockchain.
3) SCENARIO
People trade agricultural and fishery products worldwide. To prevent the falsification of transaction tracking, the use of blockchain is expanding in corporate activities. There are various cases: pork and mango [24] , palm oil [25] , coffee [26] and so on. For the example of our solution, proving traceability every 10 minutes for 100 vegetables in the permissioned blockchain consisting of 20,000 participants is practical. Then, the necessary traffic is approximately 1 Mbps. We describe the details of the example in the subsection of Section V-A. This work contributes to the realization of meaningful traceability that balances the privacy and transparency of transactions. It is different from the trivial traceability of only transaction tracking.
We describe how participants issue and verify the proof. Participants in the permissioned blockchain initially share state information. Therefore, it is allowable that they share the randomness in encrypting it. They can attach a threshold signature to the proof of the ciphertext of zero as follows.
1) Some of the participants choose randomness and create a ciphertext and proof. 2) This randomness, ciphertext, and proof are broadcast to the participants within the permissioned blockchain and shared. 3) Other participants verify these by creating their ciphertext and proof from the received randomness and plaintext. 4) Participants attach a ring signature to the verified proof similar to the withdrawal of Dilly et al. [27] .
Furthermore, participants make the proof of the ciphertext of zero itself public in the internet storage. For example, Amazon Web Service S3 would be good. Participants in the permissionless blockchain verify the proofs in the storage.
B. RELATED WORK
There is great interest in protecting privacy in blockchains. One of the approaches is mixing transactions, exemplified in some works [28] - [31] . Zerocoin [32] , which is an extension of Bitcoin, is one of the initial proposals that provided unlinkability between individual Bitcoin transactions without introducing a trusted party. Pinocchio coin [33] proposes to incorporate the zero-knowledge succinct non-interactive argument of knowledge (zk-SNARK) [34] into Zerocoin. Moreover, Zerocash [35] , which is the successor to Zerocoin, uses zk-SNARK as a zero-knowledge proof of arithmetic circuit satisfiability. Recently, zero-knowledge scalable transparent argument of knowledge (zk-STARK) [36] and Bulletproofs [37] have been proposed as similar zero-knowledge proofs. Both works mention an application to the blockchain. Thus, the zero-knowledge proof is a crucial tool for privacy protection in the blockchain.
Let us refer to some other approaches. The schemes blinding all unspent transaction output (UTXO) while maintaining the public verifiability that no trade produces or destroys coins have been proposed [38] , [39] . As an application of Hyperledger Fabric, there is a method of protecting the privacy within each channel by setting confidentiality boundaries [40] .
The Markov chain often describes dynamics in the blockchain. There are several kinds of studies on selfish mining about Bitcoin [41] - [43] .
Regarding homomorphic encryption, there are some works for encoding integers into plaintext space. First, regarding the NTRU encryption scheme [44] , Hoffstein and Silverman announced the new technique [45] . Later, the work on the Brakerski-Vaikuntanathan (BV) scheme [11] was published using a similar technique [46] . Recently, the work on the Fan-Vercauteren (FV) scheme [12] has also been published [47] .
1) CONCURRENT WORK
Let us confirm the concurrent works from the viewpoint of traceability in Table 1 . Dilly et al. have proposed the connection scheme between Bitcoin and the permissioned blockchain Liquid [27] . In this scheme, the permissioned blockchain's participants determine the transfer of assets between Bitcoin and the permissioned blockchain through their consensus. A fast and deterministic agreement of its participants realizes the high throughput of transactions. This scheme is often called sidechain. In Dilly et al. [27] , the pool account to a permissionless blockchain is public. There are no unauthorized deposits or withdrawals in this account. Thus, preservation holds, although Dilly et al. do not specify this matter.
Poelstra et al. [39] mention that there is no unauthorized increase or decrease in coin history and the number of coins traded is concealed. However, the sender and receiver must be public.
The work on remittance with anonymous accounts at Ethereum exists, which is Zether [48] . The balance between the sender and the receiver and the transfer amount can be kept confidential. Third parties other than the sender and receiver are usually not involved in the transaction. On the other hand, to hide the recipient, the sender intentionally sends zero remittance to a third party. The sender is detectable. Moreover, if it is visible that some recipient is a third party, then trade privacy is damaged. It is difficult for Zether to achieve noninvolvement and trade privacy simultaneously.
Finally, let us state the comparison to our recent preliminary work [1] . In the scheme of Dilly et al. [27] , the permissionless blockchain cannot verify the transactions and their history in the permissioned blockchain. However, the trans-actions and their history became verifiable and concealable in the scheme of our preliminary work. The concept of traceability introduced in our preliminary work results in more than preservation. In this work, we append a new concept called noninvolvement. Other additional contributions are as follows.
• Proving security of trade privacy • Applying noninteractive zero-knowledge proof • Adopting ring isomorphism encoding • Estimating the encrypted model by somewhat homomorphic encryption Compared with these works, this work is the first proposal that satisfies the three properties of traceability. This work achieves both trade privacy and transparency simultaneously.
C. PAPER ORGANIZATION
We organize the rest of this paper as follows. Section II describes our prerequisites, definitions, and rules for the rest of this paper. Section III defines traceability and describes its three properties. Section IV represents the model as ciphertexts of Ring-LWE encryption, and introduces the ring isomorphism encoding. In Section V, we confirm that the traceability of the asset can be observable to an outsider by applying the zero-knowledge proof of plaintext knowledge. Finally, Section VI concludes this paper.
II. PRELIMINARIES A. NOTATION
Let N, Z, Q and R be the set of natural numbers, the set of integers, the set of rational numbers and the set of real numbers, respectively. Let Z q = Z/qZ = {0, 1, . . . , q − 1}. We identify a vector (a 0 , . . . , a n d −1 ) with a polynomial a 0 + a 1 X + · · · + a n d −1 X n d −1 , where n d is the degree of the polynomial. Let R := Z[X ]/ X n d + 1 and let R q := Z q [X ]/ X n d + 1 = Z[X ]/ X n d + 1, q . We denote the norms of a = a 0 + a 1 X + · · · + a n d −1 X n d −1 ∈ R q as follows, where |a i | is the absolute value of a i .
If the element a is sampled from a distribution A or the element a is sampled randomly from a uniform distribution over the set A, then we denote a $ ← − A. We denote the Big O notationÕ(·), which is called Bachmann-Landau notation or asymptotic notation. We denote the ω notation ω(f (n)), which is an arbitrary function growing asymptotically faster than f (n). We denote an oracle as O.
B. RING-LWE ENCRYPTION
We introduce definitions regarding Ring-LWE encryption.
is the continuous normal distribution over R n d centered at v with standard deviation σ . If v = 0, then we write ρ n d v,σ as ρ n d σ . [17] ).
is just a normalized quantity necessary to express the function as a probability distribution. We also mention that for all
, that is, the scaling factor is the same for all v. If the dimension n d is clear from the context, then we omit n d and write D n d σ as D σ . We note that the Ring-LWE assumption still holds even if we choose the secret s according to the error distribution D σ rather than uniformly [10] . Now we introduce Brakerski-Vaikuntanathan (BV) scheme [11] . We describe plaintext space, key generation, encryption and decryption as follows.
is a public key and s is a secret key. • To decryptm = (c 1 , c 2 ) with secret key s and obtain a plaintext m, compute m = (c 1 −s · c 2 mod q) mod p. Note that the randomness (that is, "noise") contained in the ciphertext increases with the addition and multiplication. For noise growth, multiplication has a greater effect than addition. To reduce the increasing noise, we can apply the processing called bootstrapping. However, this is costly. Homomorphic encryption without the bootstrapping is called somewhat homomorphic encryption.
C. PEDERSEN COMMITMENTS
Let us introduce Pedersen commitments [49] for the zeroknowledge proof. Given a family of prime order groups {G(λ)} λ∈N such that the discrete logarithm problem is hard in G(λ) with security parameter λ, letq =q(λ) be the order of G = G(λ). To avoid confusion, we denote all elements with orderq with a tilde in the following. We will write the group G(λ) additively. = (mg + rh, r). Theorem 1 (Theorem 2.1. in [17] ): Under the discrete logarithm assumption for G, the given commitment scheme is perfectly hiding and is computationally binding.
In Fig. 1 and 3 of this paper, we make use of the above scheme as an auxiliary commitment scheme. We denote it as (aCSetup, aCCommit, aCOpen).
D. REJECTION SAMPLING
To realize zero-knowledge, the technique of rejection sampling is useful [21] , [22] .
Theorem 2 (Theorem 4.6 in [22] ): Let V be a subset of Z m in which all elements have norms less than T , σ be some element in R such that σ = ω(T √ log m), and h : V → R be a probability distribution. Then, there exists a constant M = O(1) such that the distribution of the following algorithm A:
is within statistical distance 2 −ω(log m) M of the distribution of the following algorithm F:
More concretely, if σ = αT for any positive α, then M = e 12/α+1/(2α 2 ) , the output of algorithm A is within statistical distance 2 −100 M of the output of F, and the probability that A outputs something is at least 1 
It is possible to conceal the information of the witness by using this technique. Therefore, we apply this technique when the prover sends the response to the verifier in Fig. 1 and 3 of this paper.
E. ZERO-KNOWLEDGE PROOF
In Ring-LWE encryption, the secrets s and e, such that b = as + e where (a, b) is open, are polynomials with small coefficients. We describe the formal definition of the -protocol, the protocol and its theorem proving this relationship.
Definition 2 (Definition 2.5. in [17] ): Let (P, V ) be a two-party protocol, where V is a PPT, and let L, L ⊆ {0, 1} * be languages with witness relations R, R such that R ⊆ R . Then, (P, V ) is called a -protocol for L, L with completeness error α, a challenge set C, a public input x and a private input w, if and only if it satisfies the following conditions:
• Three-move form: The prover P, on input (x, w), computes a commitment t and sends it to V . The verifier V , on input x, then draws a challenge c $ ← − C and sends it to P. The prover sends a response s to the verifier. Depending on the protocol transcript (t, c, s), the verifier finally accepts or rejects the proof. The protocol transcript (t, c, s) is called accepting, if the verifier accepts the protocol run.
• Completeness: Whenever (x, w) ∈ R, the verifier V accepts with probability at least 1 − α. α is the completeness error.
• Special soundness: There exists a PPT algorithm E (the knowledge extractor) that takes two accepting transcripts (t, c , s ), (t, c , s ) satisfying c = c as inputs, and outputs w such that (x, w ) ∈ R . The knowledge error denotes the probability that the verifier accepts the proof even if the prover does not know a witness.
• Special honest verifier zero-knowledge (HVZK): There exists a PPT algorithm S (the simulator) taking x ∈ L and c ∈ C as inputs. Moreover, the simulator outputs (t, s) so that the triple (t, c, s) is indistinguishable from an accepting protocol transcript generated by a real protocol run. The protocol in Fig. 1 will further satisfy the following useful property.
• High-entropy commitments: For all (y, w) ∈ R and for all t, the probability that an honestly generated commitment by P takes on the value t is negligible. where 2s and 2e are reduced modulo q. The protocol has a knowledge error of 1/(2n d ), a completeness error of 1−1/M , and high-entropy commitments. We can make the interactive proof noninteractive by using the Fiat-Shamir heuristic [50] .
III. TRACEABILITY AND MODELING
We introduce the traceability. We confirm its three properties: trade privacy, preservation, and noninvolvement.
A. TRACEABILITY
According to the review paper [51] , various researchers define traceability in various ways, none of which are perfect. Some researchers define the flow of products from suppliers to users and vice versa. Many works seem to define traceability by focusing on the ''objects'' moving between players. In contrast, we focus on how the ''state'' of the amount of an asset held by each account changes from a given time to the next time, as discrete-time progresses in the blockchain.
We consider the mathematical definition based on this idea. There are accounts for participants in a blockchain. Each account holds a certain amount of an asset. Let x(t) be the amount of assets in the permissioned blockchain at time t. x(t) is a row vector consisting of m p elements, where m p is the number of the participants. That is, x(t) = (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x m p ) ∈ P m p , and let x i be the amount of an asset held by the participant i in the permissioned blockchain and let P be a subset of Q. In the same way, let u(t) be the amount of assets that transfer from the permissionless blockchain to the permissioned blockchain, and let y(t) be the amount from the permissioned blockchain to the permissionless blockchain. Let u(t) and y(t) be row vectors that consist of l p and n p elements, respectively. That is, u := (u 1 , u 2 , . . . , u l p ) ∈ P l p and y := (y 1 , y 2 , . . . , y n p ) ∈ P n p . We state the definition of traceability as follows.
Definition 3 (Traceability): At each time t, t + 1, let x(t), x(t + 1) be the amount of assets in the permissioned blockchain, respectively. Let y(t + 1) be the amount of assets moving from the permissioned blockchain to the permissionless blockchain at time t + 1. Let u(t) be the amount of assets moving from the permissionless blockchain to the permissioned blockchain at time t. If x(0) and u(0) are determined at the initial time t = 0 and for every time t ≥ 0, then there exists some deterministic polynomial-time algorithm A such that (x(t + 1), y(t + 1)) = A(x(t), u(t)).
B. MODELING
We discuss the deterministic polynomial-time algorithm specifically. We list the model parameters in Table 2 . x is information in the permissioned blockchain. A participant in the permissioned blockchain can observe x. However, any participant in the permissionless blockchain cannot. u and y are information in the permissionless blockchain. Everyone can observe them. We call it a hidden Markov model as x is a latent variable for an outsider. One hidden Markov model corresponds to one kind of object (apple, banana, coin, and so on). When we deal with multiple objects, we evaluate each model for each object. We also make its creation and consumption correspond to the input and the output to the permissioned blockchain.
We confirm the state transition. We suppose that the total volume moving from x i (t) to x j (t + 1) is v; then,
At this time, we define the distribution rate a ij := v/x i (t).
In particular, we consider a ii as the ''staying'' rate (x i (t) → x i (t + 1)). In same way, we define the distribution rate c ij := v/x i (t). Therefore, the amount x i (t) is distributed to x 1 (t + 1), . . . , x i (t + 1), . . . , x m p (t + 1) at the ratio of a i1 , . . . , a ii , . . . , a im p and distributed to y 1 (t + 1), . . . , y n p (t + 1) at the ratio of c i1 , . . . , c in p . The sum of all the ratios must be equal 1. That is, We also define the distribution rate b ij := v/u i (t) flowing from u i (t) in x j (t +1). u i is distributed to x 1 (t +1), . . . , x m p (t + 1). The sum of all these ratios must be equal to 1. That is, We confirm the following lemma with regard to Definition 4, 5.
Lemma 1 (Overall Preservation): If Definition 4 and 5 are satisfied, then the equation
holds.
Proof: First, we expand the equations of Definition 4. For our convenience, we omit "(t)" such as x(t) or A(t) in this proof. The same abbreviation applies to elements of vectors and matrices. Applying
We also obtain 
The preservation holds.
We state the plain example in Appendix A. Next, we define noninvolvement and describe local preservation. VOLUME 8, 2020 Definition 7 (Subset of Involvement): S r is a subset of involvement such that the subset excludes participants of noninvolvement from the set of blockchain participants {1, . . . , m p }.
Lemma 2 (Local Preservation): If Definition 4 and 5 are satisfied and S r is a subset of involvement, then the equation
Proof: From Lemma 1,
holds. Since every participant belongs to S r or not,
As any participant i ∈ S r is represented by noninvolvement,
Therefore, we obtain i∈S r
We note that the three properties of traceability correspond to Definition 4, 5, and 6. We denote Definition 4, 5, and 6 as the ''traceability model'' as follows.
Definition 8 (Traceability Model):
• Trade Privacy: 
IV. CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN THE MODEL AND CIPHERTEXT
To conceal the state in the permissioned blockchain, we intend to encrypt the traceability model of Definition 8 as ciphertexts of Ring-LWE encryption. We note that the processing of the traceability model of Definition 8 is closed in P, although one of the ciphertexts is closed in R q . We discuss this correspondence in this section.
A. RING ISOMORPHISM ENCODING
First, we discuss the correspondence between P and the plaintext space M = R p = Z[X ]/ X n d + 1, p . We suppose that the rational numbers in P are fixed-point numbers. A fixed-point number is a number with a fixed number of digits. For example, we can handle 8.22 or 82.2 as the integer 822. We can map fixed-point numbers to integers. Specifically, we define P as follows.
We introduce the efficient encoding and decoding, the ring isomorphism encoding (RIE) [46] . Definition 9 Ring Isomorphism Encoding:
• The encoding of an integer z ∈ Z with |z| ≤ 2 n−1 to a polynomial m ∈ R p is
Theorem 4 (Theorem 1 in [46] ): For a ∈ Z, the map φ : Z/ x n + 1, x − a → Z/ a n + 1 given by
is an isomorphism. Letting a = 2 in Theorem 4, we obtain R x−2 ∼ = Z 2 n +1 . Letting n = n 1 , we choose the input integer space as Z/ 2 n 1 −1 . That is, the input integers exist in {−(2 n 1 −1 − 1), . . . , 2 n 1 −1 − 1}. As |z| ≤ 2 n 1 −1 , the decoding becomes simpler from Definition 9, that is, z = z .
B. CIPHERTEXT OF ZERO
We confirm that the traceability model of Definition 8 corresponds to the ciphertext of zero. We define the set C 0 as a set of ciphertext obtained by encrypting plaintext m = 0 as follows.
Definition 10 (Ciphertext of Zero):
where s is a secret key.
We change the traceability model of Definition 8 into implicit functions f . Regarding the trade privacy, we obtain
Regarding the preservation, we also obtain 
We note that a ij , b ij and c ij themselves correspond to f directly regarding the noninvolvement.
P includes all the elements of the traceability model of Definition 8. The above functions f 1 , f 2 , f i 3 and f i 4 are also closed by P. An element in P corresponds to R p by RIE. R p corresponds to R 2 q with Ring-LWE encryption. We denote the ciphertextā ∈ R 2 q corresponding to a ∈ P. We represent the vectors and matrices obtained by encrypting each element in the same way. We denote encrypted vectors asū := (ū 1 ,ū 2 , . . . ,ū l ),x := (x 1 ,x 2 , . . . ,x m ), and y := (ȳ 1 ,ȳ 2 , . . . ,ȳ n ). We denote encrypted matrices as A := (ā ij ),B := (b ij ) andC := (c ij ). Therefore, we denote the functionf for ciphertexts in R 2 q corresponding to the function f for plaintexts in P.f 1 ,f 2 correspond to Definition 4 andf i 3 ,f i 4 correspond to Definition 5. For some i,ā ij ,b ij and c ij themselves correspond to Definition 6. We obtain the encrypted functions as follows.
Definition 11 (Encrypted Traceability Model):
• Trade Privacy:
• Preservation:
We confirm the security of the trade-privacy equationsf 1 ,f 2 . We intend to hide the private information A(t), B(t), C(t) and x(t) in these equations. We consider the trade-privacy equations calculated by ciphertexts of honest plaintexts and fake plaintexts (all zeros). We say that the trade privacy is secure if and only if both are indistinguishable for an adversary. Since the trade-privacy equationsf 1 ,f 2 consist of inner products, we propose the security challenge experiment in Fig. 2 . We introduce the following theorem and prove this theorem in Appendix B.
Theorem 5 (Security of Trade Privacy): For any λ ∈ N and any PPT adversary A, we have that 
C. SOMEWHAT HOMOMORPHIC ENCRYPTION
We show that somewhat homomorphic encryption is feasible for the traceability model of Definition 8. We define the benchmark function f as follows, considering the inner product in the traceability model of Definition 8.
where z ij ∈ Z corresponds to an element of the matrices and vectors of the traceability model of Definition 8.
We confirm the range of integers. Since |z ij | ≤ 2 n 1 −1 ,
We obtain n d > log 2 l add + l mul (n 1 − 1).
Next, we confirm the decryptable noise magnitude. First, we confirm the noise growth. Let c = (c 1 , c 2 ) ∈ R 2 q and c 1 −s · c 2 = m + p · e. s is a secret key, m is a plaintext and e is a noise. Then, we denote the norm DN(c) := |m + p · e| ∞ VOLUME 8, 2020
From the condition that we can decrypt c ∈ R 2 q correctly, we have
The relationship between the operations of ciphertexts and the noise growth are as follows.
where we used the lemma shown below. Lemma 3 (see Lemma 1 in [46] ): Let a, b ∈ R q ; then,
The size of noise is small. Let
According to [46] , let B fresh be the size of noise in no operation of ciphertexts; we have
From the above equations, we can transform the condition DN(c) < q/2 into q/2 > l add B l mul fresh n l mul −1 d . We obtain log 2 q > log 2 l add + l mul log 2 (B fresh n d ) − log 2 n d + 1. (2) We confirm the parameters in Ring-LWE encryption. Following Table 1 in [52] , we choose the concrete parameters: n d = 2048, log 2 q = 64 and σ = 8, which is the standard deviation of the discrete Gaussian distribution for the randomness. As our intention toward the traceability model of Definition 8, we choose n 1 = 65 (which is a 64-bit integer) and l mul = 2. Then, let B χ = σ √ n d ≈ 362 from the following lemma:
Lemma 4 (Lemma 4.4 in [53] ): Let n d ∈ N. For any number σ > ω( √ log n d ), we have
At this time, we confirm the upper limit of the number of additions l add in the traceability model of Definition 8 satisfying the inequalities 1 and 2. We show the upper limits of the number of additions l add corresponding to n d and q in Table 3 .
We can calculate the traceability model of Definition 8 with sufficiently numerous additions l add under the practical parameters. That is, we can realize the traceability model of Definition 8 as somewhat homomorphic encryption. 
V. ZERO-KNOWLEDGE PROOF OF TRACEABILITY
By applying Theorem 3 introduced in Section II, we can show a ciphertext of zero with zero-knowledge. However, there is a completeness error and knowledge error in the protocol. Therefore, we suppress the errors to a negligible degree by executing this protocol for a certain number of times in parallel. Moreover, the permissioned and permissionless blockchain do not move synchronously. The noninteractive zero-knowledge proof between blockchains is desirable. We change the protocol introduced in Theorem 3 into a noninteractive one with the Fiat-Shamir heuristic [50] .
We show a noninteractive zero-knowledge proof of ciphertext of zero in Fig. 3 . h is a cryptographic hash function. The hash function outputs c randomly on behalf of the challenge value c sent by the verifier. This protocol satisfies the following lemma.
Lemma 5 (Noninteractive Zero-Knowledge Proof): The protocol in Fig. 3 is an HVZK -protocol for the following relations: where 2v, 2e and 2f are reduced modulo q. The protocol has a knowledge error of 1/(2n d ), a completeness error of 1−1/M , and high-entropy commitments. We prove this lemma in Appendix C. Finally, we describe the main theorem of this paper and its proof.
Theorem 6 (Zero-knowledge Proof of Traceability): Let us apply the protocol in Fig. 3 for λ times in parallel (the parallel protocol) for an encrypted functionf in Definition 11. Let the parallel protocol be accepting if and only if at least λ/2M out of λ proofs were valid under the condition that an honest verifier rejects no proofs. Then, the parallel protocol has both a completeness error and knowledge error of negl(λ) under the condition n d ≥ 2 M .
Proof: In the parallel protocol, λ commitments
aux } 1,...,λ are sent to a verifier. We confirm the probability that at least λ/2M out of λ proofs are valid. Each execution in the parallel protocol is independent, so it is a Bernoulli trial. We introduce Chernoff bounds as follows.
Lemma 6 (Chernoff bounds (see e.g., Theorem 4.4, 4.5 in [54] )): Let x 1 , . . . , x λ be independent Bernoullidistributed random variables with Pr[x i = 1] = p and Pr[x i = 0] = 1 − p; then, for X := λ i=1 x i and µ := λp,
First, we confirm a completeness error. From Lemma 5, a prover sends proof with a probability 1/M for each time. Applying first and second inequalities of Chernoff bounds under the condition that p = 1/M , µ = λp = λ/M and δ = 2/3,
proofs are made and accepted with overwhelming probability. Therefore, the completeness error is negl(λ). Second, we confirm a knowledge error. From Lemma 5, a knowledge error is 1/2n d for each time. Let p = 1/2n d , µ = λp = λ/2 n d and δ = n d /M − 1 ≥ 1 such that (1+δ)µ = λ/2M . Applying the third inequalities of Chernoff bounds,
Therefore, the knowledge error is negl(λ).
A. EFFICIENCY
The computation of the encrypted model is limited to low degrees. We can achieve it with somewhat homomorphic encryption. In other words, bootstrapping is unnecessary. Therefore, the method is effectively practical for real use regarding computation.
We confirm the proof size issued by the prover with the noninteractive zero-knowledge proof. There are multiple ciphertexts for which we want to prove that the plaintext is zero. Then, there is an excellent way to reduce the traffic per ciphertext. We pack these ciphertexts into elements of one vector. The inner product of the vector is also one ciphertext. We apply the protocol in Fig. 3 to the ciphertext. therefore, we can reduce the proof size per ciphertext. An additional inner product calculation increases the degree by one. The addition increases by k add times the number of equations we want to prove. Compared to the case where there is no inner product calculation, we need to enlarge the dimension of the lattice and the ciphertext space. In the same way as discussed Section IV, we can express the inequalities as follows. n d > log 2 k add + 2(log 2 l add + l mul (n 1 − 1)) log 2 q − 1 > 2 log 2 l add + 2 l mul log 2 B fresh +(2 l mul − 1) log 2 n d + log 2 k add In same way as shown in Table 3 , we can also estimate the proof size in Table 4 . We set the zero-knowledge proof count to λ = 128 for 128-bit security and k add = l add . The proof size is at most 627.7 kB.
We naively evaluate the traffic regarding the example of vegetables distributed in Japan. We state elements as follows. • There are approximately 90 items whose production volume is determined by statistics, according to Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries, Japan. 1 The traffic is proportional to the number of items since one item corresponds to one encrypted model.
• SEVEN-ELEVEN JAPAN CO., LTD. has opened approximately 21,009 stores in Japan as of October 31, 2019. 2 The number of participants corresponds to the number of stores. The number of participants is approximately 21,000. It does not affect the traffic because the number is much smaller than the upper limit 2 28.5 in Table 4 .
• Frequency of proof is once every 10 minutes, as in Bitcoin. We assume that the permissioned blockchain proves the traceability once every 10 minutes.
• Properties of traceability amount to three. In Table 4 , we apply l mul = 2 regarding trade privacy and l mul = 1 regarding preservation and noninvolvement. This fact triples the traffic.
• The proof size is 363.7 kB according to Table 4 . Therefore, the traffic is equal to 363.7 kB × 3 property × 90 item/600 sec = 1.3 Mbps.
The global averages on fixed broadband are 70.68 Mbps (download) and 38.23 Mbps (upload) as of October 2019, according to Speedtest by Ookla. 3 Since the traffic is sufficiently smaller than the averages, it is feasible.
VI. CONCLUSION
We have achieved privacy protection and high transparency in a permissioned blockchain. Traceability consists of the three properties: trade privacy, preservation, and noninvolvement. It is the first proposal wherein both preservation and noninvolvement hold while protecting the trade privacy. We have constructed a traceability model based on the three properties, and encrypted it with Ring-LWE encryption. Moreover, we have used ring isomorphism encoding, and encrypted 1 http://www.maff.go.jp/j/seisan/ryutu/yasai/yasai_jousei_0111.pdf (Website in Japanese) 2 https://www.sej.co.jp/company/en/n_stores.html 3 https://www.speedtest.net/global-index the model with somewhat homomorphic encryption. Finally, we have shown the protocol that can verify the knowledge that the plaintext is equal to zero by using the noninteractive zero-knowledge proof. In this work, we have expressed the traceability model of Definition 8 with a fixed-point number. As this extension, we can take an arbitrary denominator. Then, the number of multiplications is approximately the same as the number of participants since a reduction to a common denominator is necessary. Because of many numbers of multiplication, we can extend this work theoretically by fully homomorphic encryption.
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APPENDIX A PLAIN EXAMPLE
We describe the plain example. We suppose that Alice, Bob, and Carol are participants in the permissioned blockchain. They have 2, 3, and 4 BTC in each account, respectively. We formulate this situation as follows.
We suppose that they execute the following three transactions during [t, t + 1].
• Alice gives Bob 1 BTC. • Bob gives Carol 2 BTC. • Carol gives Alice 3 BTC. We assume that there is neither deposit nor withdrawal between the permissioned blockchain and permissionless blockchain. We consider only internal transactions within the permissioned blockchain. Then, their accounts are represented by the following state.
x(t + 1) = (x 1 (t + 1), x 2 (t + 1), x 3 (t + 1)) = (4, 2, 3)
We represent the increase or decrease in the asset quantity by each transaction as the ratio,
We obtain x(t + 1) = x(t)A(t), where 
APPENDIX B PROOF OF THEOREM
To prove Theorem 5, we first describe the syntax of the Ring-LWE scheme, and then prove the theorem. Definition 12: Syntax of the Ring-LWE Scheme: We describe the Ring-LWE scheme represented by a tuple of PPT algorithms RLWE := (RLWE.Gen, RLWE.Enc, RLWE.Dec) with the following syntax. We denote a message space as M and a ciphertext space as C.
• RLWE.Gen(1 λ ) returns a key pair (pk, sk) from an input 1 λ .
• RLWE.Enc(pk, m) returns a ciphertext c ∈ C from an input of the public key pk and a message m ∈ M.
• RLWE.Dec(sk, c) returns a message m ∈ M or ⊥ from an input of the secret key sk and a ciphertext c ∈ C. We confirm the following definition corresponding to the Ring-LWE assumption of Definition 1.
Definition 13 (Pseudorandomness of ciphertexts (see, e.g., Definition 7 in [55] Proof: To prove the security of trade privacy, we consider the games shown in Fig. 6 . We denote events as follows: 
APPENDIX C PROOF OF LEMMA
We prove Lemma 5 following the proof in [17] . First, we introduce the technical lemma mentioned in [17] . Lemma 7 (Lemma 3.1. in [17] ): Let n be a power of 2 and let 0 < i, j < 2 n d − 1. Then, 2(X i − X j ) −1 mod (X n d + 1) only has coefficients in {−1, 0, 1}. Now, we prove Lemma 5 as follows. Lemma 8 (Noninteractive Zero-knowledge Proof (Re-post of Lemma 5)): The protocol in Fig. 3 is an HVZK -protocol for the following relations: Proof: We discuss the proof from the following points: completeness, honest verifier zero-knowledge, special soundness, and high-entropy commitments.
